

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002800013000-1

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 1 JUNE 49

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 25X1X

COUNTRY Morocco/Egypt

SUBJECT North African Committee of Liberation (NACL)
and Moroccan Nationalist Parties
25X1A

PLACE

ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO

1. Abd-el-Krim, [redacted] exercises almost no control over the policies and decisions of the Nationalist parties in Morocco. He has been out of touch with the local situation so long that his advice and leadership are not considered by Nationalists as very important. Krim's principal usefulness to the cause is as a symbol of resistance to Spanish and French occupation. While members of the North African Liberation Committee were still active, Abd-el-Krim did have a certain influence over decisions made in Cairo, but could not impose his will on the membership, which received instructions from party leaders in Morocco. A consistent policy was difficult to achieve because of the right which each party reserved to act independently, and because there was no real voting system or strong leader.
2. Questions involving Morocco in the NACL were more easily solved because of the close liaison between the Islah and Istiqlal parties, whose representatives in Cairo presented a solid front there, with all major differences of opinion being thrashed out between leaders in Morocco.
3. No one person in the Istiqlal Party makes policy, which is decided on by a Central Committee. Mohamed ben Allal El Fassi, second only to Ahmed Balafrej in leadership of the Istiqlal Party, had the power to make decisions in Cairo, but usually acted with the consent of the Istiqlal Central Committee. One of the reasons for his return to Morocco was his desire to regain not only prestige lost during his absence but also influence over party policy. Executive decisions to implement Central Committee policy lay mostly in the hands of Balafrej in Rabat, while El Fassi was in Cairo.
4. The Islah Party theoretically works on the same basis, but as the Central Committee cannot meet together because of Spanish repressive measures, the exiled leaders in Tangier, Abdeljalek Torres and Taleb Bennuna, have been making most decisions.

5. [REDACTED] 25X1X
X [REDACTED] The Sultan did exercise

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CLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

Document No. 009

NO CHANGE in Class.

☒ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: **TE**

DEA Memo. 4 Apr 75

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

82-00457-0002800130010-9
Date: 1978-10-17 By: [illegible]

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Next Review Date: 2008

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000200130010-9

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Approved For Release 2001/07/23 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002800130010-0
25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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a great unifying influence, however, over the N.A.C.L. Moroccan delegates, and according to source, probably prevented open dissension between the Shoura Party and the Istiqlal-Islah bloc. He usually communicated his wishes to Cairo through the representatives of the Istiqlal Party, who in turn often used the Islah channel through the British Post Office or Eastern Telegraph in Tangier.

SECRET

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